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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PRICE CoNTROL AcT-RECENT AMEND-

MENTs-On July 1, 1944, the "Stabilization Extension Act of 1944" 1
hep.me effective, thereby introducing several important changes in the
1 Pub. L. 383, 78th Cong., 2d sess., approved June 30, 1944, hereinafter cited
as the "Extension Act." Hearings were held before the House Committee on Banking
and, Currency, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Brent Spence, Ky., chairman, between April 12
and May 19, 1944, on ~.R. 4376, "A Bill to Extend the period of Operation of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and of the Act of October 2, 1942," hereinafter
cited as "H. Hearings." Similar hearings were held before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Robert F. Wagner, N.Y., chairman, between March 15 and April 28, 1944 on S. 1764, "A Bill to Amend the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, as amended." H.R. 4376 was superseded in the House by
H.R. 4941, which was reported upon favorably by the Committee on Banking and
Currency on June 3, 1944; H. Rep. No. 1593, 78th Cong., 2d sess. S. 1764 with
amenilments was reported upon favorably by the Senate Committee on May 30, 1944;
S. Rep. No. 922, 78th Cong., 2d sess. S. 1764 pass~d the Senate with amendments on
June 9, 1944. • The House, after tabling H.R. 4941,' also passed S. 1764, but with
further amendments, on June 14, 1944. Conferees were appointed and the Committee of Conference reported favorably upon S. 1764 in a compromise form on June
20, 1944; H. Rep. No. 1698, 78th Cong., 2d sess. Both Houses passed the conference
bill on· June 21, 1944, and the Pre~ident signed it on June 30, 1944. On April 24,
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field of price control law.2 Many of these changes have the effect of
granting relief to persons subject to price control, while others are
designed to aid the price administrator in his enforcement of the Price
Control Act.
Time Limit
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 8 provided for the
termination of price control "on June 30, 1943, or upon the date of a
proclamation by the President, or, upon the date specified in a concurrent resolution by the two Houses of the Congress, declaring that the
further continuance of the authority granted by this Act is not necessary in the interest of the national defense and security, whichever
date is the earlier."" By the amendatory act of October 2; 1942, the
original act was extended to June 30, 1944.5 The Stabilization Extension Act has now extended the original act to June 30, 1945, although the authority of the President by proclamation and of the
Congress by concurrent resolution to terminate the act at an earlier
date continues.6
Prices, Rents, and Market and Renting Practices
Established Accounting Methods. Section 2(a) of the original act,7
which gives the price administrator the authority, consistent with certain
standards of guidance, to establish maximum prices by regulation or
order, has been amended by the addition of the following proviso: 8
1944, the House Select Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, hereinafter cited
as the "Smith Committee," Howard W. Smith, Va., chairman, in its Fifth, Intermediate
Report, reported favorably upon H.R. 4647, "A Bill to Amend the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, as amended;" H. Rep. No. 1366, 78th Cong., 2d sess. However,
H.R. 4647 was tabled.
2
The Stabilization Extension Act of I 944 amended the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, approved Jan!Jary 30, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.)
App. § 901 et seq. and the Inflation Control Act of 1942, approved October 2, 1942,
56 Stat. L. 765, 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 961 et seq., now known as the
"Stabilization Act of 1942." Price and rent control were held constitutional in Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944) and Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641 (1944). For an analysis of litigation under the Emergency
Price Control Act of I 942, see Sprecher, "Price Control in the Courts," 44 CoL. L.
R.Ev. 34 (1944).
8
Hereinafter cited as the "original act" or the "Price Control Act."
4
Section 1(b), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.§ 901(b).
5
Section 7(a), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 967; Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 at 419 (1944).
6 Section IOI of Extension Act; H. Rep. No. 1593 on H.R. 4941, 78th Cong.,
2d _sess., p. 2. By § 203 of the Extension Act, § 6 of the Stabilization Act of 1942
has also been amended to extend that act to June 30, 1945.
1
50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.§ 902(a).
8
Section 102 of Extension Act.
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"Provided, That no such regulation or order shall contain any
provision requiring the determination of costs otherwise than in
accordance with established accounting methods."·
·

Industry Advisory Committees. Section 2.(a) of the original act,
provided that the administrator "so far as practicable, advise and consult with representative members of the industry which will be aff ec-ted" by a proposed regulation or-order, and that, in cases where an
industry advisory committee had been appointed by the administrator,
the committee ccmay make such recommendations to the Administrator
as it deems advisable." 9 The extension act provides that the administrator "shall give consideration" to the recommendations of representative
members of the affected industry and to the recommendations of industry advisory committees.10
Termination of Rent Control Under Certain Circumstances. Section 2 (b) of the original act 11 has been amended to provide that the
administrator shall abolish rent controls whenever he finds in any
defense-rental area or in any portion thereof that ccthe availability of
adequate rental housing accommodations and other relevant factors
are such as to make rent control unnecessary for the purpose of
eliminating speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in rents
-and of preventing profiteering, and speculative and other disruptive
practices resulting from abnormal market conditions _caused by congestion.ni2 But whenever, in the judgment of the administrator, it is
necessary or proper to re-establish rent control in any defense-rental
-area or portion thereof, he may do so in accordance with the standards
-set forth in the original act.
Individual Rent Adjustments In Hardship Cases. Section 2.(c) of
the original act stated that the administrator "may provide for such
-adjustments and reasonable exceptions, as in the judgment of the
Administrator are necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this Act." 13 The extension act adds the following:
"Under regulations to be prescribed by the Administrator, he
shall provide for the making -of individual adjustments in those
classes of cases where the rent on the maximum rent date for any
housing accommodations is, due to peculiar circumstances, substantially higher or lower than the rents generally prevailing in
the defense-rental area for comparable housing accommodations,
and in those classes of cases where substantial hardship has re50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.§ 902(a).
Section 102 of Extension Act.
11
50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 902(b).
12
Section 102 of Extension Act.
18
50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 902(c). (Italics supplied.)
9

10
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sulted since the maximum rent date from a substantial and unavoidable increase in property taxes or operating costs." 14
The administrator had previously provided in his various rent
regulations for individual adjustments of maximum rents in certain
enumerated classes of cases.15 The amendment requires him to add to
those classes of cases, the following classes: (I) Where the rent on the
"maximum rent date" 16 is substantially lower than rents generally prevailing in the defense-rental area for comparable housing accomoda.tions; 17 ( 2) where substantial hardship has resulted since the maximum
rent date from a substantial and unavoidable increase in property taxes;
and (3) where substantial hardship has resulted from a substantial increase in operating costs. The Emergency Court of Appeals, created
by the original act, had held that, under the language of the original
act, none of the three classes of cases mentioned above was entitled to
relief.18 However, liberal use of the word "substantial" in the extension
act precludes any wholesale granting of relief to landlords under the
amended act.
Subsidy Payments. Section 2(e) of the original act gave the administrator the power to buy and sell domestic and imported commodities and to make subsidy payments to domestic producers.19 However,
14
Section 102 of Extension Act. (Italics supplied.) See also H. Hearings, pp.
2160-2163.
15
See § 5, Standard Maximum Rent Regulation, C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE,
PRICES, 1f 49, l 28.
16
The "maximum rent date" method of rent stabilization, used by the administrator and approved by the Emergency Court of Appeals [Northwood Apartments v.
Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 809; Spaeth v. Brown, (Erner. Ct. App.
1943) 137 F. (2d) 669; Hillcrest Terrace Corp. v. Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943)
137 F. (2d) 663; Taylor v. Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 654;
Lakemore Co. v. Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943), 137 F. (2d) 355; Chatlos v.
Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 490], is thus approved in principle by
Congress.
17 The administrator had previously provided in rent regulations that he could
"on his own initiative or on application of the tenant" order a decrea.re of the maximum
rent in cases where it was higher than the rent generally prevailing in the defense-rental
area for comparable accommodations. See § 5(c) (1), Standard Maximum Rent Regulation, C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE, PrucES, 1f 49,128. This provision was thus expressly approved by Congress. For probable effect of provision requiring increase where
rent is lower than comparable rents, see H. Hearings, p. n5.
18
Class (1): Madison Park Corporation v. Bowles, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 140
F. (2d) 316; Machen v. Bowles, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 359.
Class (2): Avant v. Bowles, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 702; Lakemore
Co. v. Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 355.
Class (3): Avant v. Bowles, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 702; Spaeth v.
Brown, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 669; Chatlos v. Brown, (Erner. Ct.
App. 1943, 136 F. (2d) 490.
19
50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 902(e).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

the operation of this provision was dependent upon .the willingness of
Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to enable the administrator to
buy commodities or make subsidy payments.20 The extension act has
made such dependence express and continuing by adding the following
prpvision: 21
"After June 30, 1945, neither the Price Administrator nor the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation nor any other Government
corporation shall make any subsidy payments, or buy any conmodities for the purpose of selling them at a loss and thereby
subsidizing directly or indirectly the sale of commodities, unless
the money required for such subsidies, or sale at a loss, has been
appropriated by Congress for such purpose; and appropriations for
such purpose are hereby authorized to be made."
Section 2 ( e) of the original act also provided that any commodity
defined as a strategic or critical material by the President pursuant to
section 5d of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act could be
bought and sold, and subsidy payments could be paid, only by corporations created pursuant to section 5d, after a determination by the federal
loan administrator, with the approval of the President, that the maximum necessary production is not being obtained or may not be obtained
during the ensuing year.22 The extension act adds a proviso to the effect
that no agricultural commodity or commodity manufactured or processed in whole or in substantial part from any agricultural commodity
intended to be used as food for human consumption shall be defined as
a strategic or critical material, unless it _has been so defined prior to the
effective date of the amendatory proviso.23
Business Practices. Section 2(h) of the original price control act
provided that the powers granted to the administrator "shall not be
used or made to operate to compel changes in the business practices,
cost practices or methods, or means or aids to distribution, established
in any industry, except to prevent circumvention or evasion" of a regulation or order.24 This prohibition against the administrator has been
20 Ginsburg, "The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and
Sanctions," 9 L. AND CoNTEMP, PROB. 22 at 45 (1942). The appropriation act for
the operation of the Office of Price Administration for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1943, expressly provided "that no part of this appropriation shall be available for
making any subsidy payments." First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation
Act, 1943, approved July 25, 1942, Pub. L.'678, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 56 Stat. L.
704 at 712. Beginning in June 1943, however, the Office of Price Ad:ll1inistration
began to make subsidy payments. H. Hearings, p. 1807.
21 Section 102 of Extension Act.
22 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 902(e).
23 Section 102 of Extension Act.
24 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 902(h).

1 944]

COMMENTS

1 93

~trengthened somewhat by the amendment of the exception to provide
"except where such action is affirmatively found by "the Administrator
to be necessary to prevent circumvention or evasion" of a regulation or
order. 25 Furthermore, to the catalog of changes prohibited has been
added "changes in established rental practices." 26
Fishery Commodities. The extension act provides that "no maximum price shall be established for any fishery commodity below thy
average price of such commodity in the year r 942," 21 whereas the
original act used the year "r94r." 28
Highe,st Price Line. In order that consumers could continue to
purchase clothing at customary price levels, the administrator provided
in several clothing price regulations a "highest price line limitation" or
an "over-all ceiling rule," 20 which prevented sellers from selling garments at a price higher than the highest price at which similar garments
were sold during the base period determined by the regulation.30 Thus
vendors of clothing were unable to sell higher grades of clothing than
they sold during the base period. Such a regulation resulted in unfairness to long-established businesses and in enrichment f01; newcomers
who were not under any such restrictions and could therefore offer
higher priced goods.u The extension act prohibits the administrator
from requiring any retail seller "to limit his sales with reference to any
highest price line offered for sale by him at any prior time:'' 32 The
administrator may still require manufacturers and wholesalers to limit
their sales to a previous highest price line, however.
25 Section 102 of Extension Act. A similar provision was recommended by the
,
Smith Committee. H. Rep. No. I 366, 78th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 7-8.
26 Section 102 of Extension Act.
27 lbid.
28 Section 2(i), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 902 (i). Actually, the Office
of Price Administration "aimed at the average of 1942" even under the prior provision.
H. Hearings, p. 1923.
29 See M.P.R. 330, Women's and 'Children's Outerwear Garments, § 1389.553,
C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE, PRICES, W43,530.
80 M.P.R. 177, Men's and Boy's Tailored Clothing, § 1389.103(c), C.C.H.
WAR LAW SERVICE, PRICES, W 43,377; M.P.R. 178, Women's Fur Garments, §
1389.152(a) (2), C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE, PRICES, W 43,378; M.P.R. 287,
Women's, Girls', Children's and Toddlers' Outerwear Garments,§ 1389.351 (15)(a),
C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE, PRICES, W 43,487; M.P.R. 438, Fall and Winter
Outerwear, § 1389.603(b), C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE, PrucES, W43,638. See also,
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bowles, (Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 669;
Brown v. W. T. Grant Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 182.
81 H. Rep. No. 1366, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. IO; H. Hearings, pp. 447-448,
459-460, 516-519, 523, 531-539, 567, 1074-1075, 1387, 2146-2148, 2191-2198,
2221, 2286-2287.
32 Section 102 of Extension Act, adding § 1 (k) to the original act.
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Agricultural C.ommodities. The extension act makes several amendments relating to agricultural commodities:
I. A new subsection is added requiring the administrator, before
growers' maximum prices are established or lowered for any agricultural commodity which is the product of annual or seasonal planting, to
give notice of the proposed maximum prices not less than fifteen days
prior to the normal planting season in each major producing area
a:ffected.83
2. A new subsection is added prohibiting any governmental agency
or officer, in the payment of sums relating to the production or sale of,
or in contracts for the purchase of, or in fixing quotas for the production
or sale of, agricultural commodities under the Price Control Act or any
other act of Congress, from imposing any conditions or penalties not
authorized by the provisions of the act which authorize the particular
activity being engaged in. Any person aggrieved by any action taken
contrary to this provision may petition the district court of the district in
which he resides or has his place of business for an order or declaratory
judgment as to the lawfulness of the action, and such court may grant
appropriate relief in the event such action is found to contravene this
provision.34
3. Section 3 ( e) of the original act has bee:,;i amended t<? make it
clear that the administrator is not required to obtain the approval of the
secretary of agriculture before instituting any kind of enforcement action under section 205 of the act. 35
4. A new subsection is added requiring the administrator to adjust
33 Section 102 of Extension Act, adding § l (I) to the original act. The notice
required need not be gi'l'en, however, more than twelve months prior to the beginning
of the normal marketing season in each area. Publication of the notice in the FEDERAL
REGISTER is satisfactory, but the administrator is directed to utilize appropriate means
to insure general publicity in the areas affected. The subsection does not apply to the
1944 crop of any agricultural commodity, the normal planting season of which occurs
prior to July 3 I, 1944.
34 Section 102 of Extension Act, adding § I (m) to the original act. The provisions of the Judicial Code as to the· monetary amount involved necessary to give
jurisdiction to a district court shall not be applicable in such a case. See, in connection
with the new provision, H. Hearings, p. 1471 et seq.
35 Section I 03 (a) of Extension Act. Prior to the amendment, the section provided that the approval of the secretary of agriculture was not necessary prior to the
institution of an· action under § 205 (a) (injunction proceedings) and § 205 (b)
( criminal proceedings). The amendment makes it clear that no approval is necessary
prior to treble damage proceedings or license revocation proceedings, as well as the
other types of enforcement actions. The amendment was suggested by the administrator.
H. Hearings, pp. 2428-2429. In Bowles v. Strickland, (M.D. Go. 1944) 55 F. Supp.
13 2, the district court had dismissed a treble damage suit brought by the administrator
on the ground that prior approval had not been obtained from the secretary of agriculture.
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·the maximum prices of fresh fruits and vegetables from time to time in
order to make "appropriate allowances for substantial reductions in
merchantable crop yields, unusual increases in costs of production, and
other factors which result from hazards occurring in connection with
the production and marketing of such commodity." 86
5. The Stabilization Act of r 942 provided that maximum prices for
agricultural commodities and for commodities processed or manufactured in whole or in substantial part from agricultur~ commodities
should not be established below a price which would reflect to producers
of agricultural commodities the higher of ( r) an adjusted parity price
or ( 2) the highest price received by such producers for such commodity
between January r and September r5, r942.81 The extension act reaffirms these standards but requires that they be "applied separately to
each major item in the case of products made in whole or major part
from cotton or cotton yarn." 88
• 6. Section 8 (a) ( r) of the Stabilization Act, relating to loans upon
cotton, corn, wheat, rice, tobacco, and peanuts at the rate of ninety per
centum of parity price 89 has been amended to provide for loans upon
cotton at ninety-two and one-half per centum, applicable with respect
to crops harvested after December 3r, r943. 40
7. The proviso in the Stabilization Act permitting the President in
his discretion to adjust the maximum prices of agricultural commodities
"to correct gross inequities" 41 has been made mandatory upon him.42

Adrmnistration
Purchases by Adrmnistrator as Evidence of Violation. In the enforcement of his regulations and orders, the administrator had no express authority to make purchases of commodities for use as evidence
of violations.48 The extension act amends section 2or ( c) of the original
act H to provide that the administrator's authority to make expenditures
expressly includes the "purchase of commodities in order to obtain in86 Section 103 (b) of Extension Act, adding § 3 (g). The original senate bill
expressly included "potatoes." Elimination of the word should not affect future
determination of whether "fresh vegetables" includes "potatoes." H. Rep. No. 1698,
78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 20.
87
Section 3, 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 963.
88 Section 201 (b) of Extension Act.
89
50 U.S.C.A. (App.) § 968 (a) (1).
40
Section 204 of Extension Act. Loans already made upon any of the I 944 crop
are authorized to be increased.
n Section 3, 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 963.
42
Section 20 I (a) of Extension Act.
48
Similar authority is possessed by every comparable enforcement agency. H.
Rep. No. 1698, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 20.
44
50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 921(c).
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formation or evidence of violations of price, rent, or rationing regulations or orders or price schedules." 45
.
Formal, Written and Published Orders by Administrative Agencies.
The extension act adds a new section 20I ( e) to the original act, requiring all agencies or officers of the government exercising supervisory or
policy-making powei-:s over the Office of Price Administration, War
Food Administration, or War Production Board to exercise such powers
"only through formal written orders or regulations which shall be
promptly published ,in the Federal Register/' 46

Investigations
Hearings. Section 202(a) of the original act, authorizing the administrator to make investigations,47 has been amended to authorize
him further to "conduct such hearings" as he deems necessary or proper
to assist him in prescribing regulations or administering or enforcing the
act or regulations thereunder.48
'
•
Rights of Party Subpoenaed. In Bowles v. Baer,49 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that witnesses subpoenaed to
testify at an inquiry into possible violations of maximum price regulations were not entitled to representation by counsel of their own choosing nor entitled to be attended by a court reporter or stenographer of
their own choosing. The extension act adds a new section 202(i) which
provides as follows: 50
"Any person subpoenaed under this section shall have the
right to make a record of his testimony and to be represented by
counsel."
Procedure
Time Within Which to Challenge Validity of Regulation. In
Yakus v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a court could not consider the validity of a maximum price regulation as a defense to a criminal prosecution for its violation.51 Considered
together with the Court's earlier decision in Lockerty v. Phillips,5 2 the
Section 104(a) of Extension Act.
.
Section 104(b) _of Extension Act. However, such orders or regulations are not
otherwise subject to the Federal Register Act, and no order or regulation shall be
published if it contains information relating to military security.
47 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 922(a).
48 Section 105 (a). In Bowles v. Baer, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 787,
the court held that an investigation under § 202(a) was not a hearing but was similar
to a grand jury investigation.
49 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 787, rev'g., (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1943) 54 F.
Supp. 887.
50 Section Io 5 (b) of Extension Act.
51 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.' 414 (1944).
52 319 U.S. 182, 63 S. Ct. 1019 (1943).
45

46
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Supreme Court entirely approved the administrative and review provisions of the original act which required that all attacks up(?n the validity of a regulation of the administrator be brought within sixty days
after the issuance of the regulation and only by means of a protest to
the administrator followed by an appeal to the Emergency Court of
Appeals.Gs In his dissent in the Yakus case, Mr. Justice Rutledge
said: G4,
"The statute thus affords the individual, t0 question a regula-·
tion's validity, one route and that a very narrow one, open only
briefly. The administrator and others, to enforce it, have many/'
In the extension act, Congress has sought to relieve somewhat the
situation described, by opening to the individual for all time, the route
formerly "open only briefly." Section 203(a) 55 has been amended to
provide that any person subject to any provision of a regulation, order
or price schedule may file a protest challenging its validity "at any
time" instead of "within a period of sixty days" after its issuance.G6 The
right to file a protest at any time applies to regulations or orders issued
prior or subsequent to the effective date of the extension act.G7
This amendment not only provides relief for protestants, but also
removes the incongruities existing in the original provision. In R. E.
Schanzer, Inc. v. Bowles, the Emergency Court of Appeals held that
the somewhat ambiguous language of section 203 (a) 58 required that a
protest upon grounds first arising after the expiration of the sixty-day
period could be brought at any time, leaving open the question of
whether a protest upon grounds first arising on the fifty-ninth day after
the issuance of the regulation had to be brought within one day, sixty
days, or at any time.Go Under the amended provision, a protest may be
GB Sections 203 and 204 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50
U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. §§ 923 and 924. A petition for a writ of certiorari
may be filed in the Supreme Court of the United States from a judgment of the
Emergency Court of Appeals. 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 924(d). For
discussion of operation of prior procedure, see H. Hearings, pp. 141-144.
5
"'Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 at 464 (1944); H. Rep. No. 1366,
78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 23. See also H. Hearings, pp. 929, 1331-1332, 1360, 1789,

2028.

Gs 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.§ 923(a).
56

Section 106 of Extension Act.
H. Rep. No. 1593, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 5.
Gs 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 923(a): "Within a period of sixty days
after the issuance of any regulation or order ... any person subject to any provision
of such regulation, order, or price schedule may . • . file a protest•••• At any time
after the expiration of such sixty days any persons subject to any provision of such
regulation, order, or price schedule may file such a protest based solely on grounds
arising after the expiration of such sixty days."
59
R. E. Schanzer, Inc. v. Bowles, (Erner. Ct. App. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 262.
57
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•
filed at any time regai:dless of whether it is based upon the alleged
original invalidity of the regulation or upon grounds arising sometime
after the issuance of the regulation.
Board of Re'Uiew. Section 203 ( c) of the original act,60 has been
amended to provide that "upon the request of the protestant" any protest filed after September I, I 944, shall be considred by a board of review consisting of one or more officers or employees of the Office of
Price Administration.61 The board may conduct hearings at any place,
and upon the request of the protestant and upon a showing that material facts would be adduced thereby, subpoenas shall issue to procure
the evidence of persons, or the production of documents, or both.62
The administrator shall cause to be presented to the board such evidence, including economic data, in the form of affidavits or otherwise,
as he deems appropriate in support of the regulation under attack. The
protestant shall be accorded an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence
in writing and oral argument before the board, and the board shall
make written recommendations to the administrator. The protestant
shall be informed of the recommendations of the board and, in the
event that the administrator rejects such recommendations, shall be
informed of the reasons for such rejection.
·
Time Within Which Administrator Must Act Upon Protests. Section 203 (a) of the original act provided that the administrator should
either grant or deny a protest, notice it for hearing, or provide an opportunity to present further evidence 'in connection therewith, within
a reasonable time after its filing, but in no event more than thirty days
after such filing or ninety days after the issuance of the regulation or
order, whichever occurred later.63 In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brown,
the El_llergency Court of Appeals held that the failure of the administrator to take affirmative final action within thirty days after the filing
of, 'Or within ninety days after the issuance of, a regulation did not
amount to such a "denial" of the protest as to afford the protestant the
right to file a complaint in the Emergency Court.64
T4e extension act has provided two amendments designed to
shorten the time within which the,administrator must finally act upon a
60

61

50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) § 923(c).
Section IOp of Extension Act. See also, H. Hearings, pp. 608 et seq., 2169-

2170.
62 The administrator may decide in the ftrst instance whether a showing has
been made that material facts would be adduced by the use of the subpoena power in
a particular case, but his decision is subject to appropriate court review. H. Rep. No.
1698, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 22.
·
63 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 923(a).
64 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brown, {Erner. Ct. App. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 278. See.·
also, H. Hearings, pp. I 579 et seq., 1604.
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protest. Section 203(a) has been amended to abolish the ninety-day
alternative time limit, so that now some action must be taken by the administrator within thirty days after a protest has been :filed.65 Secondly,
a new section 203 ( d) has been added to the original att, providing as
follows: 66
"Any protest :filed under this section shall be granted or denied
by the administrator, or granted in part and the remainder of it denied, within a reasonable time after it is :filed. Any protesfant who
is aggrieved by undue delay on the part of the administrator in
disposing of his protest may petition the Emergency Court of Appeals, created pursuant to section 204, for relief; and such court
shall have jurisdiction by appropriate order to require the Administrator to dispose of such protest within such time as may be :fixed
by the court. If the administrator does not act :finally within the
time :fixed by the court, the protest shall be deemed to be denied
at the expiration of that period." 67
Review
Quorum of Emergency Court of Appeals. Under the original act,
three judges constituted a quorum of the Emergency Court of Appeals.68 The extension act provides that two judges shall constitute a
quorum of the court and of each division thereof.69
Stays of Enforcement Proceedings to Test Validity of Regulations.
To relieve further the situation presented by the Y akus case, where a
person indicted for the violation of a regulation was precluded from
65

Section 106 of Extension Act.
Section I 06 of Extension Act.
67
ln Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brown, (Emer. Ct. App. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 278 at
280, the Emergency Court indicated that it had jurisdiction, even in the absence of
express statutory direction, to require the administrator to dispose of a protest upon
which he had unreasonably delayed his decision:
"If the administrator should unreasonably delay final action it would seem clear
that this court, upon a proper showing, may under the authority of Section 262 of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 377, in aid of its jurisdiction issue an order in the nature
of a writ of mandamus directing the Price Administrator to take action upon a pending
protest."
In the cases of M. H. Nagle, Inc., No. 78, and Aberle, Inc., et al., No. 97, application for mandamus were filed with the Emergency Court. In each case the court
found that the delay had been unreasonable (protests had been filed on May 26, and
May 6, 1943, and had not been acted upon on October 13, and December 2, 1943).
It was unnecessary for the court to enter formal mandamus orders, however, since in
each case the administrator acted upon the protest before a formal order was actually
entered. H. Hearings, p. 2104.
68 Section 204 (c), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 924 (c); H. Hearings, p.
1113.
69
Section 107(a) of Extension Act.
66
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showing its invalidity,7° the extension act adds a new section 204{e),
providing for stays of enforcement proceedings under certain circumstances while the validity of a regulation is tested.11 The section provides that ·within thirty days after arraignment, or such time as the
court may allow for good cause shown, in any criminal proceeding, and
within five days after judgment in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged violation of any regulation or order, the defendant may
apply to the court in which the proceeding is pending for leave to :file
in the Emergency Court of Appeals a complaint challenging the validity of any provision which 'the defendant is alleged to have violated.
The court in which the proceeding is pending' shall grant such leave
with respect to any application (I) which it :finds is made in good faith
and ( 2) where it :finds that there is reasonable and substantial excuse for
the defendant's failure to attack the provision in a regularly filed protest. Upon the :filing of a complaint pursuant to and within thirty days
from the granting of such leave, the Emergency Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to enjoin pr set aside in whole or in part the provision complained of or to dismiss the complaint.12 The Emergency Court may
auf:4orize the introduction of evidence, either to the administrator or
directly to the court, in accordance with the rules governing evidence in
a regularly :filed complaint in the Emergency Court, and further procedure in the court is then the same as in the case of a regularly filed
complaint.
In any criminal or civil enforcement proceeding, the court ;hall
stay the proceeding (I) during the period within which a complaint
may be filed in the Emergency Court pursuant to leave granted; (2)
during the pendency of any protest regularly :filed by the defendant in
good faith prior to the institution of the enforcement proceeding; and
'(3) during the pendency of any judicial proceeding instituted by the
defendant, either upon leave granted or following the denial of a
regularly filed protest, and until the expiration of the time allowed for
the taking of further proceedings with respect thereto.
Stays shall be granted in civil proceedings only after judgment and
upon application made within five days after judgment. In the case of
an injunction proceeding brought by the administrator, the court grantYakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
.
Section 107(b) of Extension Act. ''While the constitutionality of the exclusive
jurisdiction provisions of the statute has been upheld by the Supreme Court (Yakus v.
United States), the committee is of the opinion that these provisions should be relaxed
to the fullest extent consistent with the effective administration and enforcement of
the act." H. Rep. No. IS93, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 6.
72 The thirty-day period merely specifies the time within which the complaint
must be filed in order that the Emergency Court will have jurisdiction, but do~ not
limit in any way the jurisdiction of the court to act upon a complaint filed within
such thirty-day period. H. Rep. No. 1698, 78th Cong., zd sess., p. 23.
70
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ing a stay shall issue a temporary injunction for the period of the stay.
In the event that any provision of any regulation or order is ~etermined
to be invalid by a final judgment of the Emergency Court of Appeals,
any pending enforcement proceeding shall be dismissed and any judgment vacated to the extent that such proceeding or judgment is based
upon the violation of such provision. No retroactive effect is to be given
to any judgment of the Emergency Court setting aside a provision of a
regulation or order.
·
Enforcement
Venue. The original act provided that criminal enforcement proceedings could be brought in any district in which any part of any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred, and that injunction or
treble damage proceedings could, in addition, be brought in the district
in which the defendant resided or transacted business.18 The extension
act has narrowed the venue of treble damage actions by requiring that
such actions be brought only in the district or county in which the defendant resides or has a place of business, an office, or an agent.74
Treble Dam.ages. The original act provided that a person who purchased a commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of
trade or business at a price above the maximum price or who paid rent
higher than the maximum rent was entitled to bring an action for
reasonable attorney's fees and costs plus the higher of ( r) treble damages or (2) fifty dollars.15 Although the Supreme Court of the United
States had held in Hecht Co. v. Bowles that courts were not required to
issue an injunction merely because violations of a regulation were shown
and that such courts could, in their discretion, determine what order
should be entered, considering wilfulness and other circumstances,76
nevertheless, the Supreme Court, by its refusal to review the case of
Bowles v. American Stores, Inc., left in effect a ruling that once a violation is shown in a treble damage action, the plaintiff must be given
treble damages or fifty dollars, whichever is higher, and the court can
exercise no discretion in the matter, regardless of wilfulness and other
mitigating circumstances.11
The extension act provides that an overcharged consumer is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs plus ( r) not less than the
amount of the:overcharge nor more than three times the amount of the
overcharge as the court "in its discretion may determine," or ( 2) not
18

Section 205(c), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.§ 925(c).
Section 108(a) of Extension Act.
15
Section 205(e), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 925(e).
16
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S. Ct. 587 (1944).
11
Bowles v. American Stores, Inc., (Ct. App. D.C. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 377,
rev'g. (Mun. Ct. D.C. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 388, cert. den., (U.S. 1944) 6lf- S. Ct. 947.
See also, H. Hearings, pp. 1634-1638.
74
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less than twenty-five dollars nor more than fifty dollars, as the court
"in its discretion may determine," whichever is the greater. The extension act has also added a proviso to the effect that the amount to which
the overcharged consumer is entitled "shall be the amount of the overcharge or overcharges or $25, whichever is greater, if the defendant
proves that the violation of the regulation, order, or price schedule in
question was neither wilfull ·nor the result of failure to take practicable
precautions against the occurrence of the violation." 78 E'urthermore,
the extension act prohibits the granting of separate minimum judgments for each overcharge.78
The original act provided that the administrator could bring a treble
damage action in cases where the purchaser was a purchaser in the
course of trade or business arid not a purchaser for use or consumption.80
The extension act broadens the administrator's right to bring treble
damage actions by authorizing him to bring such actions where the purchaser is a purchaser for use or consumption but fails to institute an action within thirty days from the occurrence of the violation. If the administrator brings such ~ction, the buyer is thereafter barred from
bringing an action for the same violation.81
The amendments, insofar as they relate to a:ctions by buyers or actions which may be brought by the administrator after the buyer has
failed to institute an action, are applicable only with respect to violations occurring after the date of enactment of the extension act. In cases
where the administrator is the only person entitled to bring the action,
the amendments are applicable with respect to proceedings pending on
the date_ of enactment or instituted thereafter.82
License Suspension. In L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, the
78 Section 108(b) of Extension Act. (Italics supplied.) See also H. Rep. No.
1698, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 23. 79 Section 20 5 (e) ,- as amended, reads in part as follows:
_ "A judgment in an action for damages under this subsection shall be a bar to the
recovery under this subsection of any damages"in any other action against the same
seller on account of sales made to the same purchaser prior to the institution of the
action in which such judgment was rendered."
Prior to the amendment, if there was a series of overcharges, the purchaser was
entitled to recover at least fifty dollars for each such overcharge. For example, if a
roomer who paid his rent by the day was overcharged fifty cents a day for ten days,
he was entitled to recover :five hundred dollars from his landlord even though the
aggregate amount of overcharges was only five dollars. H. Rep. No. 1593, 78th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 8. See also Sprecher, ~•Price Control in the Courts," 44 CoL. L. REV. 34 at
62, n. 160 (1944). Under the amended provision, in the example cited the recovery
would be fifty dollars if the violation was willful, twenty-five dollars if it was not. ·
80 Section 205(e), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.§ 925(e).
81 Section 108(b) of Extension Act.
82 Section 108(c) of Extension Act.
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Supreme Court of the United States held that the price administrator
. had the power under the Second War Powers Act 88 to prevent a person
who has violated a rationing order from dealing in rationed commodities.84 However, the administrator had attempted to use this power to
punish violations of price regulations and orders issued under the
Emergency Price Control Act. 85 The extension act provides that a person who has violated a price regulation or order cannot be prevented
from dealing in rationed commodities by a rationing suspension order,86
although, of course, he may be prevented from dealing in the commodity in connection with which a price violation occurred, by a license suspension order under section 20 5 ( f) ( 2) of the Price Control Act. 87
Review of Rationing Suspension Orders. The extension act adds a
new section 205(g) to the original act, providing that district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin or set aside in whole or in
part orders for suspension of allocations, and orders denying a stay of ·
suspension, issued by the administrator under the Second War Powers
Act. An action to enjoin or set aside such orders shall be brought within
:five days after the service thereof, and no suspension order shall take
effect within :five days after it is served, or, if an application for a stay
is made to the administrator within such :five-day period, until the
expiration of :five days after service of an order denying the stay. No
interlocutory relief shall be granted against the administrator unless
the applicant therefor consents to the entry of an order enjoining him
from violation of the regulation or order involved in the suspension
proceedings.88
·
Robert A. Sprecher*
83 56 Stat. L. 176, approved March 27, 1942, 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App.
§ 631 et seq.
84 L. P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 1097.
85 H. Hearings, pp. 482 et seq., 717-,-719; H. Rep. No. 1366, 78th Cong., 2d
sess., pp. 24-25.
86 Section 108(d) of Extension Act, amending§ 205(f)(2), 50 U.S.C.A. (1943
Supp.) App. § 925(f)(2).
87 50 U.S.C.A. (1943 Supp.) App. § 925(f}(2).
88 Section 108(e) of Extension Act.
A.B., J.D., Northwestern University; member of the Chicago (Ill.) bar.

*

